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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.
S 59-1-608 (Supp. 1987) to entertain this appeal from the
Decision and Summary Judgment issued by the Tax Division of the
Third Judicial District Court on December 23, 1986.1

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Plaintiff-Appellant Kennecott Copper Corporation
("Kennecott") originally brought this case under Utah Code Ann. §
59-11-11 (1953) , as amended to recover taxes paid under protest
to Salt Lake County.

The defendants in that action (presently

the defendants-appellants) were Salt Lake County, Arthur L.
Monson and Milton Yorgason (the "County") and the State Tax
Commission of Utah ("Tax Commission") (presently a defendantrespondent) . 2

in Rio Algom Corporation v. San Juan County, 6 81

P.2d 184 (Utah 1984) , this Court resolved the underlying legal
basis for

Kennecottfs claim against the plaintiff-Kennecott.

1

The Appellant Salt Lake County states that this Court's
jurisdiction is founded upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i)
(1953) , as amended. That section merely provides in part that
the Supreme Court has jurisdiction "over any court of record over
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction." Section 59-1-608 provides in part that "The sole
and exclusive remedy for review of a decision or order of the tax
division of any district court shall be by appeal to the Supreme
Court. . . . "
2 The County's opening brief lists the "State Tax Commission of
Utah" as an appellant in the caption. That listing is incorrect
since the County has appealed from a judgment granting the Tax
Commission's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. In this
appeal, the Tax Commission stands in the same position as
Kennecott. It is a respondent.
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Thereafter the County pursued its counterclaim against Kennecott
and its crossclaim against the Tax Commission in the district
court.

Kennecott and the Tax Commission each filed a Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings in the district court, which the court
granted.
The County has taken the present appeal from the district
court's Order and Summary Judgment granting those motions.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-17 (1953), as amended, now

codified at Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-309 (Supp. 1987), permits the
County to force the Tax Commission to reassess Kennecott1s
property because it is allegedly underassessed.
2.

Whether Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (1953), as amended (the

"net proceeds" formula by which the Tax Commission assessed
Kennecott's mining claims) violates Article XIII, sections 2 and
3 of the Utah Constitution.3

3 The Tax Commission agrees with Kennecott's framing of the
issues involved in this appeal, but has intentionally restricted
the issues discussed in this brief to those facing the Tax
Commission. As a Second Cause of Action in its crossclaim, the
County asserted that the Tax Commission had failed to disclose to
the County requested information about Kennecott1s assessment.
Although the district court granted the Tax Commissions Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to the County's Second
Cause of Action in its crossclaim (Rec. 1012), the County does
not raise the disclosure issue on appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 19, 1982, Kennecott filed an action under Utah Code
Ann. § 59-11-11 (1953), as amended, (now Utah Code Ann. § 59-21411 (Supp. 1987)) seeking recovery of property taxes it paid the
County.

Kennecott1s complaint asked the court to declare that

Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5 (1953), as amended was unconstitutional
because it afforded taxation relief to locally assessed property
but not centrally or state assessed property.
On June 25, 1982, the County filed its Answer,
counterclaimed against Kennecott and crossclaimed against the Tax
Commission.

The County alleged in its counterclaim that

Kennecottfs property had been undervalued by the Tax Commission,
and that the County, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-17,
should therefore be permitted to reassess the property for the
immediately preceding five years and to collect taxes on the
reassessed value.

(Rec. 56-57).

The County's crossclaim against the Tax Commission
incorporated the counterclaim against Kennecott.

Presumably upon

the same basis as its counterclaim, the County crossclaimed that
the Tax Commission could be ordered to reassess Kennecottfs
property according to what the County called "assessment
practices that will bring the Plaintiff's property . . . up to
their full cash value . . ."

(Rec. 60)

The crossclaim did not

specify what "assessment practices11 were supposedly incorrect,
except to allege that the "net proceeds" formula mandated under
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (1953), as amended (by which the Tax
Commission values "mining claims") was unconstitutional.
-4-

Id.

This Court resolved the case-in-chief against Kennecott in
Rio Algom Corporation v, San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah
1984).

Specifically, that case upheld the constitutionality of

Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5 against Kennecottfs claim that the
imposition of unequal tax rates on state and local assessed
property, as authorized by that statute, violated the federal and
state constitutions.

The parties thereafter stipulated that the

original action was no longer part of the proceeding.
The County's counterclaim and crossclaim then remained the
outstanding matters for resolution before the district court.
Both Kennecott and the Tax Commission thereafter challenged the
County's standing to file its counterclaim and crossclaim.

In

Kennecott Corporation v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 456
(Utah 1985) , this Court held that the County had standing to seek
"judicial review" of its counterclaim against Kennecott and its
crossclaim against the Tax Commission.
On September 18, 1986 Kennecott filed a Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings with respect to the County's counterclaim, and
on September 26, 1986, the Tax Commission filed its own Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to the County's
crossclaim. (Rec. 725-727, 742-744).

The County followed with

its Motion for Summary Judgment to which it had attached various
affidavits and documents.

(Rec. 771-867) .

On November, 26, 1986, the district court heard oral
argument on the foregoing motions and on Kennecott's Motion to
Strike joined by the Tax Commission and on the Tax Commission's
own Motion to Strike.

(Rec. 1004).
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After a two and one-half hour hearing, the district court
ruled from the bench.

The district court: (1) granted

Kennecott's and the Tax Commission's respective Motions to
Strike;

(2) denied the County's Motion for Summary Judgment; (3)

granted Kennecott's and the Tax Commission's respective Motions
for Judgment on the Pleadings; and (4) dismissed the County's
counterclaim and crossclaim with prejudice.

(Rec. 1004, 1013).

In the subsequently issued Decision and Summary Judgment,
the district court held with respect to the County's crossclaini
against the Tax Commission that:
The Court rules that Salt Lake County's
crossclaim First Cause of Action against the
State
Defendants
is
improper
in that
underassessment
is
not, and
does not
constitute grounds for, escaped assessment;
and further, that the net proceeds method of
assessing metalliferous mines and mining
claims set out in Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57,
1953, as amended, is constitutional . . . .
(Rec. 1012).4
The County then brought the present appeal.

On August 17,

1987, Kennecott filed a Motion to Strike various addenda the
County had included in its opening brief to this Court and upon
which the County had constructed a substantial part of its
argument.

See, e±SL± Brief of Appellant at 11-15.

The Tax

Commission joined Kennecott's motion.
On September 11, 1987 this Court granted the RespondentKennecott's Motion to Strike.

4 The district court's Decision and Summary Judgment with respect
to the County's counterclaim against Kennecott is quoted in
Kennecott's brief.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Tax Commission agrees with the arguments Kennecott
advances in its brief.

For that reason, it does not serve any

useful purpose for the Tax Commission to duplicate those
arguments here.

Instead, this brief merely summarizes what the

Tax Commission understands are the salient points of Kennecott's
arguments and devotes the bulk of discussion to supplementary
argument.
The County cannot recover additional taxes from Kennecott
for 1981 and four years prior thereto under Utah Code Ann. § 595-17 (1953) , as amended because the Tax Commission allegedly
undervalued or underassessed Kennecott's taxable property.
Neither can the County force the Tax Commission to reassess
Kennecott's taxable property under Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-17
(1953) , as amended because that statute affords a remedy only to
property which has escaped assessment, not property that is
allegedly underassessed; and because the statute, under any
circumstance, applies only to the County Assessor, not the Tax
Commission.
The County is not entitled to a declaration as to the
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (the "net proceeds"
statute) because it cannot force a reassessment of Kennecott's
taxable property, and because, as a result, this Court should
avoid passing upon constitutional questions that are unnecessary
to a determination of the merits.

In any event, Utah Code Ann. §

59-5-57 (1953) , as amended is constitutional because the
legislature has broad powers under the Utah Constitution to tax
metalliferous minerals as it deems proper.
-7-

ARGUMENT
I
THE COUNTY CANNOT FORCE THE TAX COMMISSION TO REASSESS
KENNECOTT1S PROPERTY UNDER UTAH'S ESCAPED ASSESSMENT STATUTE,
The County's opening brief does not directly address the
crossclaim against the Tax Commission.

Point I of the County's

brief discusses the constitutionality of section 59-5-57 (the
"net proceeds" statute).

Points II and III of the County's brief

are devoted to arguing that an alleged undervaluation is the
statutory equivalent of an escaped assessment.

Yet the brief

concludes its discussion of these points with the statement that
it was error for the trial court to dismiss Salt Lake County's
counterclaim with prejudice.

Brief of Appellant at 13 and 17.

It is consequently difficult to understand upon what basis the
County thinks the district court allegedly errored in dismissing
the County's crossclaim if the County makes no mention of the
5
crossclaim in its brief.
The crossclaim incorporates by reference the first four
paragraphs of the counterclaim against Kennecott.

(Rec. 57).

Paragraph four of the counterclaim alleges:
That the properties owned by the Plaintifff
both real and personal, located within Salt
Lake County, have been underassessed by the
State Tax Commission of Utah, thereby
resulting in the Plaintiff's receiving a
benefit at the expense of the other taxpayers
5 The basis of the County's crossclaim has always been somewhat
vague. Kennecott states in its brief that "The County also
crossclaimed against the Commission, asking that the Commission
be required to value Kennecott's property in a fashion which was
not pled or specified. . ." Brief of Respondent Kennecott at 2.
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of Salt Lake County, which benefit is
contrary to law and, in particular, a
violation of Article 13, Section 3 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah.
(Rec. 54)(emphasis added) •
The County then continues in its crossclaim to allege that
the Tax Commission has undervalued Kennecottfs taxable property,
including personal property and improvements (paragraph

6) and

further alleges that the Tax Commission, by implementing section
59-5-57 has caused an undervaluation of Kennecott's mining claims
(paragraph 8).

(Rec. 57-59).

It is not clear from the

crossclaim upon what basis the County claims a cause of action
against the Tax Commission.
Two theories are possible.

First, the County alleges that

the Tax Commission, by valuing Kennecott's mining claims
according to section 59-5-57, has unconstitutionally undervalued
those claims.

Second, the County alleges that the Tax

Commission's general valuation techniques have undervalued all of
Kennecott's property, including improvements and personal
property.

The County's crossclaim does not clarify, even

conceding that the County has standing to seek judicial review,
how the County's claims for relief could be granted against the
Tax Commission for such alleged undervaluation.

6 This Court has previously characterized the County's crossclaim
as alleging (1) that section 59-5-57 is unconstitutional and (2)
that the Tax Commission's valuation methods in general do not
reflect full cash value. 702 P. 2d at 456. The Court then held
that the County was entitled to judicial review of those claims
without intimating what the outcome of that review should be.
Id.

_9_

The County's constitutional claims against the Tax
Commission are discussed in the next section of this brief. The
other aspect of the crossclaim, however, is presumably based upon
the theory that undervaluation is the equivalent of "escaped
assessment11 as the latter term is used in section 59-5-17 , and
that the County Assessor can therefore perform the assessment the
Utah Constitution and statutes specifically delegate to the Tax
Commission.
This theory is without merit for the reasons explained in
Kennecott's brief.

Specifically, Kennecott is correct in arguing

that the County Assessor cannot reassess allegedly undervalued
property under section 59-5-17 now recodified at Utah Code Ann. §
59-2-309 (Supp. 1987) . Kennecott points out that only property
omitted from the tax rolls, or which has not been "listed for
taxation", is property which has "escaped assessment" within the
meaning of section 59-5-17.
9.

Brief of Respondent Kennecott at 8-

The County's pleadings make no allegation that any of

Kennecottfs property has "escaped assessment" only that
Kennecott*s property has allegedly been undervalued or
underassessed.

Given that allegation, the virtually undisputed

law in this and other jurisdictions, as restated by the Tax
Commission in Nupetco Associates v. County Board of Equalization
of Salt Lake County, Appeal No. 84-18-1600, is:
Property which has been undervalued due to a
clerical mistake in the quantity of the
property to be assessed or in the assessed
valuation does not result in property which
has escaped valuation.
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See Brief of Respondent Kennecott at 8-9.

Cases from this

jurisdiction cited in support of Kennecott1s argument are Union
Portland Cement Co. v. Morgan County, 230 P. 1020 (Utah 1924);
and Builders Component Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 22 Utah 2d 172f
450 P.2d 97 (1969) .
In addition to the points Kennecott makes, it should be
stressed that section 59-5-17, which gives the County Assessor
the statutory right to reassess property that has "escaped"
assessment, has no bearing upon the Tax Commission's
constitutional and statutory duties. Kennecott briefly discusses
this under Point I C of its brief by demonstrating that the
County is not the assessor of Kennecott1s property.

See Brief of

Respondent at 12. From the Tax Commission's perspective, the
same point should be reinforced.
The very case upon which the County relies to give it
standing, Kennecott Corporation v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451
(Utah 1985), holds in addition that the Tax Commission has the
exclusive constitutional responsibility for assessing "mines and
mining claims." As this Court stated in the Kennecott > 702 P.2d
at 457:
Article XIII, Section 11, provides for
creation of the Tax Commission and provides
that the Tax Commission shall "assess mines
and public utilities."
In State ex rel.
Public Service Commission v. Southern Pacific
Co., we held that Article XIII, Section 11,
limits the Legislature's power to confer the
power of assessment on any other governmental
entity.
(Emphasis added.)
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The Tax Commission clearly has the undelegable
constitutional duty to assess "mines".

It follows that the

County, by seeking to compel a reassessment of Kennecottfs
property under section 59-5-17 is likewise asking the judiciary
either to (1) apply section 59-5-17 to the Tax Commission and
force it to reassess the property; or (2) permit the County
Assessor to reassess Kennecottfs property again under section 595-17.

Both remedies are inappropriate.

The judiciary cannot

grant the first remedy because it has no constitutional
prerogative to rewrite section 59-5-17 and make it apply to the
Tax Commission instead of the County Assessor.7

The second

remedy is inappropriate because the Tax Commissionr not the
County Assessor, has the sole constitutional responsibility of
assessing mines.
The County attempts to sustain its counterclaim by arguing
that an undervaluation can be equated with escaped assessment,
thereby making section 59-5-17 an appropriate remedy against
Kennecott and presumably against the Tax Commission as well.

The

basis for this argument is a proffered distinction between Union
Portland Cement and the County's counterclaim and crossclaim.
The County claims that "over $500 million worth of minerals
produced by Kennecott in 1981 had a value for tax purposes of
7 Utah Const, art. V sec. 1 provides in pertinent part that "no
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to
one of these departments [Executive, Legislative and Judicial]
shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others
• • • •" See also Timpanogsos Planning and Water Management
Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 690 P.2d 562,
564 (Utah 1984) wherein this Court expressed a "reluctance to
encroach upon the legislature's powers to make laws . . . ."
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zero (0) in 1981."

Therefore, says the County, these minerals

"escaped" assessment and can be reassessed by the County
Assessor.

Brief of Appellant at 11.

The defects in this argument are at least twofold:
First, as an evidentiary matter, there was no record before
the trial court or this Court to the effect that "over $500
million" worth of minerals has "escaped" taxation, assuming for
argument's sake that "escaped" means "undervalued."

The addenda

included with the County's brief imply that the "minerals" not
taxed are supposedly worth an extraordinary amount.

But those

addenda were stricken both by the trial court and this Court.
(Rec. 1007).

Factually, therefore, there is no evidentiary

support for the County's statement.
Second, Kennecott demonstrates that section 59-5-17 was
intended as a remedy for those instances in which the taxing
authority errored by overlooking and/or omitting taxable property
from the rolls that should have been included.
Respondent Kennecott at 9-12.

See Brief of

Section 59-5-17 was not intended

to overrule specific statutory authority —

in this instance,

section 59-5-57 which mandates in pertinent part:
. . . there shall be no valuation based
upon net annual proceeds for the purpose of
assessment of any such mine or mining claim
for any one year in which there were no gross
proceeds realized in the year next preceding
the year of assessment . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
The County's attempt to distinguish Union Portland Cement by
equating an oversight of fact with a mandate of law is wholly
inadequate.
-13-

THE COUNTY IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REASSESSMENT OF KENNECOTTfS
PROPERTY BECAUSE KENNECOTT ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF THE
ROLLBACK INTENDED FOR LOCALLY ASSESSED PROPERTIES,

Point III of the County's brief restates the arguments just
discussed by claiming that Kennecott's property received a
rollback in value for 1981, that a rollback constitutes "escaped
assessment", and thatf accordingly, the court may order the Tax
Commission to reassess Kennecott's property.
Appellant 13.

See Brief of

Kennecott, which also assumes that it received a

rollback for 1981, responds to this argument by reasserting its
position that allegedly undervalued property cannot be reassessed
under section 59-5-17.

Kennecott states:

As is amply pointed out in this Brief, the
allegation
by
the
County
is
not
that
Kennecott's property was not assessed at all,
but that Kennecott1s property was undervalued
and
underassessed
as
a
result
of
the
application of the roll back in 1981 and the
years prior thereto. Clearly, under Point I
above, the escaped assessment statute relied
upon by the County does not apply and may not
properly be used to have Kennecott's property
revalued for the years in question.
Brief of Respondent Kennecott at 24.
As explained above, Kennecott's argument is correct.
Kennecott does not mention, however, that there was no conclusive
evidence before the trial court that the Tax Commission, rightly
or wrongly, ever gave Kennecott the rollback it assumes it
received.

John Stewart's affidavit,8 the only affidavit which

8

John Stewart is the Supervisor of Mine Valuation for the
Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission.
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was not stricken below, states unequivocally:
For the tax years 1981 and 1982, the Property
Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission
valued Kennecott1s property as follows:
a)
Kennecott1s personal property was valued at
it's fair market value, meaning historical
cost less depreciation.
b)
Kennecottfs
improvements,
meaning
improvements
to
existing structures attached to the land,
were valued at a 1978 base year value and
then multiplied by a factor or "factored up"
to
current
fair
market
value.
c)
Kennecottfs mining claims were valued at the
statutory rate mandated by Utah Code Ann.
§59-5-57. • .
The statement in Mr. Yorgason's [stricken]
affidavit
(and
repeated
in Mike
Reed's
[stricken] affidavit, pages 9 and 11 of
Exhibit A) which claims that Kennecott's
property for 1981 and 1982 was "rolled back
to their 1789 [sic] level" is categorically
false.
(Rec. 872).
Although the County and Kennecott both make their respective
arguments assuming that Kennecott had received a "rollback" for
1981, the only evidence before the district court is ambiguous,
inconclusive or to the contrary.

Consequently, it appears that

the County, under Point III of its brief, may be asking the court
9
to redress an injury that it never received.

5 The Tax Commission does not intend by this statement to suggest
that the case ought to be remanded. Kennecott's argument, that
undervaluation is not a basis for reassessment, is fully
dispositive of this case even though the property was arguably
never "undervalued" by the "rollback".
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Ill
THE COUNTY MAY NOT HAVE KENNECOTT1S PROPERTY REASSESSED IN
DISREGARD OF THE NET PROCEEDS METHOD BECAUSE THE ORIGINALLY
ASSESSED VALUE IS NOT HIGH ENOUGH,
A.

THE NET PROCEEDS FORMULA CODIFIED AT SECTION 59-5-57 IS
CONSTITUTIONAL,

The County's principal crossclaim against the Tax Commission
appears to be that the "net proceeds" formula codified at section
59-5-57 is unconstitutional.

In reply, the Tax Commission agrees

with Kennecott that section 59-5-57 is constitutional because the
legislature has broad power to determine the method of assessing
mines in Utah.

See Brief of Respondent Kennecott at 20-21.

It

thus makes no sense to argue that the legislature's exercise of
its constitutional powers to assess mines under Article XIII
section 4 of the Utah Constitution conflicts with Article XIII
sections 2 and 3 of the same constitution.
constitutional limitation on the

The only

legislature under Article XIII

section 4 is that mining claims "shall be assessed" and that the
method in use as of 1931 when section 4 was amended "shall not be
changed before January l f 1935."
Obviously, the legislature cannot simply ignore the
requirements of Article XIII sections 2 and 3 in determining the
methods of assessment under section 4.

But this Court, in Rio

AlgoiTtf has already decided that:
Thus, §§ 2 and 3 of Article XIII permit the
Legislature to adopt means to achieve that
degree of uniformity in valuation that is
practicably attainable within the general
confines of the term "market value."
Id. 681 P.2d at 192.
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The legislature/ in short/ has broad powers to prescribe
procedures for determining fair market value and broad powers to
determine the means by which mines shall be taxed.

Reading

Article XIII sections 2, 3 and 4 together makes it virtually
indisputable that the legislature can constitutionally tax
metalliferous mines and mining claims as it deems proper.
B.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT PASS UPON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SECTION 59-5-57 .
Notwithstanding the arguments made in the preceding

paragraph that section 59-5-57 is constitutional/ this Court
should consider avoiding the constitutional question altogether.
As explained in part I of this brief/ the County has no cause of
action against Kennecott for an alleged undervaluation of its
property.

Neither can the County force the Tax Commission to

reassess Kennecott1s property because (1) section 59-5-17 does
not apply to the Tax Commission/ as explained in part I of this
brief; and (2) the County failed to protest Kennecott's
assessment before the Tax Commission/ as explained in Point II of
Kennecott's brief.
Because the County cannot force a reassessment of
Kennecott's property/ the County's constitutional claim becomes
moot.

Stated another wayf it makes no sense to adjudicate a

constitutional issue if the alleged injury of undervaluation
cannot be redressed.

This appeal should be resolved in its

entirety upon the principle that an alleged underassessment is
not interchangeable with escaped assessment.

Were this Court to

arrive at that conclusion/ it would be unnecessary to determine
-17-

the constitutionality of section 59-5-57.

As a matter of sound

jurisprudence, the constitutionality of a statute should not be
passed upon unless it is absolutely necessary for determining the
merits of the case.

See e.g. Lemback v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 200

(Utah 1981) in which this Court declined to pass upon a
constitutional question (judicial preference for maternal
custody) when the case could be decided upon another basis (best
interest of the child).

CONCLUSION
As demonstrated in this brief and in Kennecott's brief,
underassessment does not constitute escaped or omitted assessment
whereby the County Assessor, acting under Utah Code Ann. § 59-517 (1953), as amended, can reassess Kennecott's taxable property.
Consequently, the County cannot force a reassessment of
Kennecott's taxable property because it is allegedly undervalued.
In addition, the County cannot invoke Utah Code Ann. § 59-517 (1953), as amended, which expressly applies only to the County
Assessor, as a remedy to force the Tax Commission to reassess
Kennecott's taxable property.
Finally, and because the County cannot force a reassessment
of Kennecott's taxable property, it is unnecessary for this Court
to decide whether the "net proceeds" formula for taxing
metalliferous minerals, codified at Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57
(1953), is constitutional.

In any event, however, the "net

proceeds" formula is constitutional because the Utah Constitution
gives the legislature broad powers to determine how metalliferous
minerals shall be taxed.
-18-
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ADDENDUM 1

-20-

ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY

59-5-57. Assessment of mines.—All metalliferous mines and mining
claims, both placer and rock in place, shall be assessed at $5.00 per acre
and in addition thereto at a value equal to two times the average net
annual proceeds thereof for the three calendar years next preceding or
for as many years next preceding as the mine has been operating, whichever
is less; provided, however, there shall be no valuation based upon net annual
proceeds for the purpose of assessment of any such mine or mining claim
for any one year in which there were no gross proceeds realized in the
year next preceding the year of assessment. All other mines or mining
claims and other valuable mineral deposits, including lands containing coal
or hydrocarbons, shall be assessed at thirty per cent of their reasonable
fair cash value. All machinery used in mining and all property or surface
improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims and the value
of any surface use made of mining claims or mining property for other
than mining purposes shall be assessed at thirty per cent of their reasonable fair cash value. In all cases where the surface of lands is owned by
one person and the mineral underlying such lands is owned by another,
such property rights shall be separately assessed to the respective owners
In such cases the value of the surface if it is used for other than mining
purposes shall be assessed by the assessor of the county in which the
property is situated.

ADDENDUM 2

EEVENTE AND TAXATION

69-5-17. Property escaping assessment—Five-year limitation period on
assessment—Duties of assessor.—Any property discovered by the assessor
to have escaped assessment may be assessed at any time as far back as five
years prior to the time of discovery, and the assessor sbaU enter such
assessments on the tax rolls in the hands of the county treasurer or elsewhere, and when so assessed shall be reported by the assessor to the county
auditor, if made after the assessment book has been delivered to the county
treasurer, and the auditor shall charge the county assessor with the taxes
on such property, and the assessor shall give notice to the person assessed
therewith and the assessor shall forthwith proceed to secure or collect the
taxes as provided in chapter 10 of this title.

ADDENDUM 3

A*T. XIII, § 2

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

See. 2. [Tangible property to be taxed—Value ascertained—Properties
exempt—Legislature to provide annual tax for state.]
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to
its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. The property of the state,
counties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public
libraries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for either religious
worship or charitable purposes, and places of burial not held or used for
private or corporate benefit, shall be exempt from taxation. Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., which is held for sale or
processing and which is shipped to final destination outside this state within twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no situs in Utah
for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be exempted by law
from such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or produced or otherwise originating within or without the state. Tangible personal property
present in Utah on January 1, m., held for sale in the ordinary course
of business and which constitutes the inventory of any retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may be deemed
for purposes of ad valorem property taxation to be exempted. Water
rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or corporations for irrigating land within the state owned by such individuals
or corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall not be separately
taxed so long as tbey shall be owned and used exclusively for such
purposes. Power plants, power transmission lines and other property
used for generating and delivering electrical power, a portion of which
is used for furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purposes
on lauds in the state of Utah, may be exempted from taxation to the
extent that such nroDertv is used for such purposes. These exemptions
ahall accrue to the benefit of the users of water so pumped under such
regulations as the Legislature may prescribe. The taxes of the indigent
poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in such manner as may
be provided by law. The Legislature may provide for the exemption from
taxation of homes, homesteads, and personal property, not to exceed $2,000
in value for homes, homesteads, and all household furnishings, furniture,
and equipment used exclusively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in
maintaining a home for himself and family. Property not to exceed $3,000
in value, owned by disabled persons who served in any war in the
military service of the United States or of the state of Utah and by the
unmarried widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of
persons who while serving in the military service of the United States
or the state of Utah were killed in action or died as a result of such
service may be exempted as the Legislature may provide.
The Legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient, with
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the
•tate for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state debt, if any
there be, the Legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay the annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt,
within twenty years from the final passage of the law creating the debt.
(As amended November 4, 1930; November 5, 1946; November 4, 195S,
affective January 1, 1959; November 6, 1962, effective January 1, J963;
November 3, 1964, effective January 1, 1965; November 5, 196S, effective
January 1,1969.)

ART. XIII, l 3

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 8. [Assessment and taxation of tangible property—ExemptionsPersonal income tax—Disposition of revenues]
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of
assessment and taxation on all tangible property in the atnte[J accordfog to its value in money, and shall prescribe by law such regulations
as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such property, *o th;it
every person and corporation ahull pay a tax in proportion to the value
of his, her, or its tangible property, provided that the Legislature may
determine the manner and extent of taxing transient livestock and livestock
being fed for slaughter to be used for human consumption. Land used
for agricultural purposes may, as the Legislature prescribes, be assessed
accordiug to its value for agricultural use without regard to the value it
may have for other purposes. Intangible property may be exempted from
taxation as property or it may be taxed in such manner and to such extent
as the Legislature may provide. Provided that if intangible property be
taxed as property the rate thereof shall not exceed five mills on each
dollar of valuation. TThen exempted from taxation as property, the taxable
income therefrom shall be taxed under any tax based on incomes, but when
taxed by the state of Utah as property, the income therefrom shall not
also be taxed. The Legislature may provide for deductions, exemptious,
and/or offsets on any tax based upon income. The personal income tax
rates shall be graduated but the maximum rate shall not exceed six per
cent of net income. No excise tax rate based upon income shall exceed four
per cent of net income. The rate limitations herein contained for taxes
based on income and for taxes on intangible property shall be effective
until January 1, 1937, and thereafter until changed by law by a vote
of the majority of the members elected to each house of the Legislature.
All revenue received from taxes on income or from taxes on intangible
property shall be allocated to the support of the public school system as
defined in Article X, Section 2 of this Constitution. (As ameuded November
6, 1900; November 6,190C; November 4,1930; November 5,1946; November
5, 19G5, effective January 1, I960.)

